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A B S T R A C T
Chain pharmacies are expanding in many low and middle-income countries (LMICs). Historically practices of
independent pharmacies in these settings have been poor, and there is a need to understand how these new
organisational arrangements are aﬀecting the functioning of pharmacies, and the implications for public health.
Drawing on economics literature, we develop a set of hypotheses as to how chains could address the quality
failures that typify LMIC retail pharmacy markets, and explore these hypotheses using a set of 38 in-depth
interviews, conducted in Bengaluru, India between 2014 and 2015. We look speciﬁcally at how being organised
in a chain aﬀects several key behaviours: employment of qualiﬁed staﬀ; the ability of government authorities to
focus regulation on central management structures; the propensity for ﬁrms to self-regulate; and the impact of
the potentially lower-powered incentives faced by chain employees compared to independent owners. In
practice, few diﬀerences were identiﬁed between chain and independent organisations in these areas. Not all
chains were operating with a qualiﬁed pharmacist (akin to independent shops). Drug control authorities did not
take advantage of the existing chain architecture to enforce regulation. Chains did heavily self-regulate but their
focus was on customer service, rather than aspects of quality relevant to health outcomes. Additionally, wide-
spread bribery in the sector was a barrier to eﬀective drug control. Finally, the incentives faced by chain em-
ployees were not low-powered due to rewarding sales targets and pressure to increase sales. We observed that
chains exerted strong inﬂuence over their staﬀ but the potential to exploit this to improve quality of care is not
currently being realised. A shift in focus from customer satisfaction to outcomes of public health concern is
unlikely without either ﬁnancial incentives or strengthened external regulation.
1. Introduction
Pharmacies and drug stores are the ﬁrst point of care in many low
and middle-income countries (LMICs) for a range of medical conditions,
including respiratory infections, fever, malaria, injury, body and dental
pains, skin infections, diarrhoea and sexually transmitted infections
(Igun, 1987; Kamat and Nichter, 1998; Saradamma et al., 2000; Smith,
2009b; Francis N Wafula et al., 2012). Practice in these outlets is often
characterised by deﬁcient knowledge, poor adherence to treatment
guidelines, inappropriate supply of medicines, and insuﬃcient coun-
selling (R. Miller and Goodman, 2016; Smith, 2009b; Francis N Wafula
et al., 2012). In most LMICs, pharmacy retailing has traditionally been
dominated by owner-run shops, but chain pharmacies are now a
growing organisational arrangement for delivering pharmacy services
in these settings. Given the limited evidence-based policy options to
improve pharmacy practice in LMICs (R. Miller and Goodman, 2016;
Smith, 2009a; F. N. Wafula and Goodman, 2010), chain pharmacies
may have potential to address quality challenges. Despite emerging
interest amongst the global health community, empirical research on
pharmacy chains in LMICs is scant (Lowe and Montagu, 2009). Work
from high-income countries has explored the eﬀect of pharmacy type on
various outcomes (eg Fritsch and Lamp, 1997; Kalsekar et al., 2007) but
is of limited applicability to LMICs given the strength of regulatory
frameworks in these settings. With either established or growing cor-
porate pharmacy retail sector in Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria,
Kenya, Uganda, India and The Philippines (Center for Health Market
Innovations, 2014; IMS consulting group, 2014; Lowe and Montagu,
2009), there is a need to understand the eﬀects of these new organi-
sational forms on the functioning of pharmacies and the implications
for public health.
Recent years have seen the steady growth of pharmacy chains in
India. There are estimated to be around 800,000 medicine retailers,
with chains accounting for 4% of these but growing at a rate of 25% per
annum (IMS consulting group, 2014; Northbridge Capital, 2011).
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The research presented in this paper comprises part of a broader
mixed-methods study of Bengaluru's chain pharmacies which sought to
understand the public health implications of this organisational ar-
rangement. The quantitative component included a standardised pa-
tient (SP) study comparing the quality of management of two tracer
conditions at chain and independent pharmacies (diarrhoea and sus-
pected TB) (R. Miller and Goodman, 2017). The SP study showed that
quality of care, as measured by adherence to treatment guidelines, was
equally poor in chain and independent pharmacies. No shops managed
the diarrhoea patient according to current guidelines and fewer than
half for the tuberculosis (TB) case. However, chains sold signiﬁcantly
fewer harmful and prescription-only medicines (POMs) for the diar-
rhoea patient compared to independent shops (ibid). The survey also
revealed that whilst overall sales of POMs were high, sales of the more
restricted H1 (see box 1) subcategory were low, with chains not selling
any of these medicines.
Drawing on a set of in depth interviews and insights from economics
literature, the aim of this paper is to qualitatively explore how and why
the organisational structure of pharmacy chains may aﬀect the quality
of service provision. Speciﬁcally, we investigate how the chain struc-
ture might inﬂuence the knowledge of pharmacy staﬀ; the way in which
they are regulated; and the proﬁt motives faced by employees, in
comparison to independent pharmacy owners.
1.1. Theoretical approach
Various bodies of theory provide insights into the study of pharmacy
arrangements, such as those from neo-classical economics, industrial
organisation and regulatory theory. Conventional economic analysis of
pharmacy markets in LMIC typically focuses on the high likelihood of
various market failures. Inappropriate prescribing of medicines can be
associated with negative externalities (Laxminarayan, 2003) and in-
formation is highly imperfect (Mushkin, 1958). Further, the nature of
information in health markets is asymmetric (Arrow, 1963). Within the
agency relationship that results, it has been suggested that providers do
not always act as perfect agents; rather they inﬂuence demand for their
own self-interest, trading oﬀ income against patient welfare (McGuire,
2000; Morris et al., 2007). Fee for service (as in a pharmacy) is the
provider payment system most associated with the resulting ‘over-
serving’ patients (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; McGuire, 2000).
Drawing on theoretical insights, we develop a set of hypotheses as to
how chains could address some of these market failures. A prior lit-
erature review of pharmacy practice in low-middle income Asian set-
tings identiﬁed regulation, knowledge and proﬁt motive as three key
determinants of pharmacy provider behaviour (R. Miller and Goodman,
2016). Fig. 1 presents a conceptual framework detailing how being
organised as a chain may inﬂuence these determinants. Enforcing reg-
ulation is costly and logistically diﬃcult due to the fragmented nature
of pharmacy retail in India. Through consolidation (in chains) regula-
tion could be improved. First, state regulation could be focussed on
central management structures; essentially, the regulator could make
ﬁrms take responsibility for their branches. Second, ﬁrms may self-
regulate in order to preserve brand identity and image. This may, for
example, lead to greater presence of qualiﬁed pharmacists at the point
of service delivery, who are currently often absent (Basak et al., 2009;
Kamat and Nichter, 1998). Several authors have alluded to the potential
of such ‘market-based’ regulatory mechanisms within pluralised, un-
regulated markets where traditional approaches have failed e.g. (Bloom
et al., 2008; Ensor and Weinzierl, 2006). These reputation-based ways
of delivering health care are argued to build trust and can, in theory,
help to overcome the information asymmetry that characterises trans-
actions in healthcare (ibid).
Another reason why quality may improve in a chain situation arises
from the diﬀerent incentive structures in place for pharmacy owners as
opposed to managers. High-powered incentives exist when the proﬁts of
transactions ﬂow directly to the parties involved (Frant, 1996). In the
case of independent pharmacy owners, the potential for higher proﬁts
provides incentives to behave opportunistically. A hierarchical struc-
ture (as in a chain) can attenuate opportunism because the incentives
faced by the personnel working in the pharmacy are low-powered (if
salaried). While chain owners themselves will have incentives to max-
imise proﬁts, these incentives may not be transmitted directly to their
frontline staﬀ. This could improve some aspects of treatment in public
health terms, as a number of poor practices have been found to be
linked to proﬁt maximising strategies (which require eﬀort), for ex-
ample, the sale of medicines with high proﬁt margins (R. Miller and
Goodman, 2016). Other aspects of good practice, such as counselling,
are eﬀort intensive and these practices may worsen among employees
of chain pharmacies with a tendency to shirk. Some economists suggest
that incentive schemes are the key to overcoming these moral hazard
problems (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Hölmstrom, 1979). Others argue
that whilst incentives can improve eﬃciency, they do not necessarily
maximise proﬁts-the bonus required to induce high eﬀort can be sub-
stantial and yield a lower expected proﬁt than using a ﬂat wage (G. J.
Miller and Whitford, 2007).
2. Methods
Between 2014 and 2015 we conducted 38 in-depth interviews with
pharmacy employees and other stakeholders in Bengaluru, the capital
of Karnataka State, India. Bengaluru presents an appropriate setting for
this research as a number of pharmacy chains are well established. We
have used the interviews as a tool to explore the hypotheses laid out in
the above conceptual framework, an approach advocated by Miles and
Huberman (1994). The framework informed both the development of
the interview guides and the analysis, although we were open to any
new ideas or issues that arose.
The interviewees were selected as a sub-sample from the pharma-
cies in our SP survey (see R. Miller and Goodman, 2017 for more de-
tails). We used a list of all pharmacies in Bengaluru urban district,
obtained from the Karnataka State Drug Control Department, as a
sampling frame (validated through three neighbourhood censuses
which found it to be 97% accurate). The list contained 5135 in-
dependents and 529 chain shops deriving from 13 chains. Chains were
deﬁned as organisations where two or more pharmacies were operating
under the same name and the business used distinctive branding across
all outlets. For the SP survey we then selected a random sample of
pharmacies, stratiﬁed as either ‘chain’ or ‘independent’, including shops
Box 1
Classiﬁcation of Prescription Only Medicines in India.
In India POMs are classiﬁed as either H, H1 or X. Under the Drugs and Cosmetic Rules 1945, Schedule H medicines should only be sold with
a valid prescription from a doctor. In light of the high sales of these medicines in India without a prescription, Schedule H1 was introduced
in 2013. The H1 list comprises of 46 medicines (mainly 3rd and 4th generation antibiotics and anti-tuberculosis medicines) and require that
the identity of the patient, contact details of the prescriber and the name and dispensed quantity of the drug be recorded in a designated
register. Schedule X comprises of a small number of narcotics and requires the pharmacy to retain the prescription for 2 years after
dispensing.
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from 8 chains-the largest 7 and one chain of the 2–5 outlet size.
Our intention was to speak to chain executives at the 8 chains, and
within those chains staﬀ at the speciﬁc branches included in the SP
survey. Two of the eight chains represented in the SP sample refused to
participate. In two diﬀerent chains, whilst a chain executive agreed to
speak to us, they refused access to branch staﬀ. This meant that we were
denied access to the branch staﬀ of four chains. However, many of the
staﬀ working in the branches of the four chains who did agree to par-
ticipate in this part of the research had previously worked in the chains
which denied us access. These individuals were asked about their ex-
periences as ex-employees and through this mechanism ensured staﬀ
who had experience within all eight chains were interviewed. Two
chains allowed us to choose the branches in which to interview their
staﬀ, and the other two only approved interviews with employees in
speciﬁed outlets.
Through approaching head oﬃces directly, we completed in-depth
interviews with 9 chain senior executives working in/ex-employees of
the 8 chains. Additionally, we interviewed 14 staﬀ working within
chain pharmacy branches, encompassing a range of pharmacy aides,
pharmacists and pharmacy managers; 12 independent pharmacy
owners (representing a geographical range across the city); and 3 key
informants including the drug control department and pharmacy as-
sociations. Interviews were conducted by RM, with the help of a local
research assistant, in English, Kannada or, Hindi, depending on the
interviewee's preference.
Interviews with chain senior executives explored the underlying
business model, ethos and structure of diﬀerent ﬁrms, with a particular
focus on staﬀ recruitment, salaries and incentives. We also sought to
understand mechanisms employed for controlling quality, performance
management, and relationships with drug control bodies. The inter-
views with staﬀ working in chain branches focussed on the incentives
faced and motivations for working in such a setting; their relationship
with head oﬃce; and factors aﬀecting their treatment behaviour.
Interviews with independent pharmacy owners served as a comparison.
The three separate topic guides (executives, chain staﬀ, independents),
were all informed by the conceptual framework although they were
updated as new issues arose.
Coding of the interview transcripts was completed by RM in NVivo
11 and we then conducted a thematic analysis. The hypotheses in Fig. 1
were used to generate an initial set of pre-deﬁned coding categories. We
coded the data into these categories but allowed for data-generated
codes to emerge and these were added as they arose, and then the ﬁnal
coding frame was agreed by all authors. As some of the same topics
were discussed with both chain executives and branch staﬀ, we sought
to triangulate the data collected from both sources, particularly for
those working within the same chain. Care was taken to focus on what
interviewees did (ie through speciﬁc examples) rather than just broad
statements about an issue; although when discussing sensitive issues it
was found to be helpful to ask about how other pharmacies acted be-
cause interviewees were sometimes reluctant to admit themselves to
practices that would be frowned upon.
Ethical approval was obtained from the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee, UK and the SOCHARA
Institutional Scientiﬁc and Ethics Committee in Bengaluru, India.
Verbal consent, witnessed by a ﬁeldworker, was obtained prior to all
interviews. Verbal, as opposed to written consent was obtained as
providers in many drug outlets (or chain headquarters) tend to be very
cautious of inspectors and suspicious of having to sign documents that
may be used to identify them or their outlet/company.
3. Findings
Considering the lack of literature on pharmacy chains in LMIC, we
begin this section with a description of the pharmacies studied and the
context in which they operate. The ﬁndings that follow are then orga-
nised under the three main elements of the conceptual framework -
knowledge, regulation and proﬁt motive. We visit each of the hy-
potheses regarding how chains may aﬀect these determinants and
present the supporting or refuting evidence from our data.
3.1. Characteristics of chain and independent pharmacies
There were 13 chains operating in Bangalore city and, between
them, they accounted for 529 (9%) of Bangalore's 5664 retail pharmacy
outlets. Chains ranged in size from having two outlets in the city to 200
plus, and ﬁve had presence outside of Karnataka.
The organisational structure of most chains was broadly similar,
consisting of some or all of the following in the senior management
team: a managing director or chief executive, an operations director,
human resources, purchasing and business development directors.
Below this team sat the regional managers. In branches, they employed
an in-charge, who may or may not be a pharmacist (despite legal re-
quirements), 2–5 pharmacy aides (assistants who require no qualiﬁca-
tions), and a delivery person. The individuals who owned and ran these
chains, especially the larger outﬁts, tended to be educated to a high
(university) level and often abroad. Whilst most independent stores had
an open, on-the-street shop frontage, chains were often fully enclosed.
Chain branches usually had air conditioning, were neatly organised,
and some aimed for a more ‘international’ feel compared to in-
dependent shops. Salaries of staﬀ working in chain pharmacies
Fig. 1. Hypothesised eﬀects of pharmacy chains on quality of care provision.
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reportedly ranged from 5 to 12k Rs (US $78–187) monthly for phar-
macy aides and 12-25k Rs (US $187–390) for pharmacists.
Interviewees reported large growth in the sector over the last 10
years. During this time, chain pharmacies have amassed thousands of
outlets nationally and independent pharmacies have also proliferated.
One informant recalled that his pharmacy was one of only 17 in
Bangalore in 1961. Competition for business between the now
5000 + pharmacies in the city was said to be intense. As a result,
pharmacies compete to provide a better service than their neighbours.
New trends such as extended opening hours, discounts on medicine
prices and additional customer services including home delivery and
health camps (these involve free screening for various health problems
such as diabetes, bone mass density, eye and dental checks, and are
used to stimulate business) were quick to spread.
3.2. Knowledge
Hypothesis 1. More trained pharmacists at point of service delivery?
Whilst we were not able to verify the proportion of chains and in-
dependent stores staﬀed by qualiﬁed pharmacists, senior management
amongst all chains claimed that they employed a qualiﬁed pharmacist
to work in each store. However, several of these informants later ad-
mitted that recruitment of pharmacists was a major challenge and this
was not always possible. Some commented on a scarcity of qualiﬁed
personnel in the labour market. Many pharmacy graduates were said to
open their own store, ﬁnd a position in the pharmaceutical industry, or
pursue careers unrelated to pharmacy. Poor salaries and low social
status reportedly drove people out of the profession.
Both chain and independent shop staﬀ talked about renting the
certiﬁcate of a qualiﬁed pharmacist, whilst the certiﬁcate holder
worked elsewhere. Where a pharmacist was present, due to long
opening hours, this was only for a portion of the day. Further, cover was
seldom provided for pharmacist's day oﬀ and holidays.
“No, in some shops they will be there and in some shops they are not
there. If the staﬀ shortage is there, only Pharma Aide and experienced
person will be there. Pharmacist will not be there.” KI#20 chain phar-
macy aide
“No, we don't have [DPharm or BPharm], we have taken license of some
other person…yearly we have to pay 30 thousand.” KI#31 independent
owner
Many interviewees talked about ‘experience’ and saw this to some
degree as a substitute for formal qualiﬁcations. In fact, individuals with
several years' experience working in independent shops were viewed by
some as more knowledgeable than qualiﬁed pharmacists. A few inter-
viewees cast doubt over the quality and appropriateness of pharmacy
education. The syllabus was described as outdated, with a focus on
subjects such as extemporaneous preparations that are no longer re-
levant to pharmacy practice today and missing others such as ‘ther-
apeutics’. The reality was that pharmacy personnel learn on-the-job.
Experience was acquired through various means, including learning
from the shop seniors or pharmacist, doctors' prescriptions and cus-
tomer requests for medicine. It appears that knowledge accumulated
from these avenues was not always in line with treatment guidelines
but, once learned, these practices were enacted, reinforced, and passed
onto the next ‘trainee’. Some chains provided training for new staﬀ
members but the focus of this was on interaction with customers and
company procedures, rather than anything medicine-related (described
in more detail below). As one chain in-charge said:
“Everyday some problems some problem like somebody came and say me
that give me Taxim-O 200mg [3rd generation cephalosporin]. Just I don't
know what is the use of it. Ask the sir [pharmacist], after customer went
oﬀ, ‘Sir it's for what.’ He says it's for fever, antibiotic. Just he is ex-
plaining and we are learning from that only.” KI#8
Another employee describes how he came to learn about the med-
icines he sells:
Respondent: I am zero knowledge person in the beginning. I was in
checking for one year in [large pharmacy chain] for audit department.
We will go morning by 8, we check cash, and total A-Z stock will be
checked. Morning 8 to 6 we do that. If any shortage is there, we have to
inform to manager …
When I started getting to know about medicine knowledge, in this audit
we got to know the medicine name and what is the molecule. After that I
could do in outlets. Then I worked for 2 years as normal employee. After
I got promotion as in-charge and worked for 1 year.
RM: Did you get any training while joining?
Respondent: No training. That audit was training.
RM: After auditing when you joined the pharmacy store, was there any
training at that time?
Respondent: No. I will observe and learn.
RM: What did you study?
Respondent: B.com in computers. It's a degree. KI#19 chain pharmacy
aide
Interviewees in chains reported no legal requirement for a member
of the senior management team to possess pharmacy qualiﬁcations and
take responsibility for maintaining safety standards. As such, the clin-
ical aspect of running a pharmacy within a chain was left to the
pharmacist or in-charge and not a matter concerning senior manage-
ment.
The overall picture we gained of staﬀ working in chain pharmacies,
and the knowledge they possessed did not appear to be any diﬀerent to
those working in independent pharmacies, where the narrative around
qualiﬁcations and experience was similar to that in chains.
3.3. Regulation
This section examines hypotheses 2a and 2b, before turning to a
data-generated theme around bribery.
Hypothesis 2a. State regulation more easily enforced by concentrating on
central management structures?
We found that drug inspectors did not enforce regulation through
chain headquarters. Within Karnataka state, areas are divided into
‘circles’ (geographical areas comprising of several postcode zones).
Bengaluru has 6 circles with an assistant drug controller (ADC) assigned
to each. Under the ADC are 2–3 drug inspectors. ADCs and drug in-
spectors each take responsibility for a number of postcodes within the
circle and are required to inspect each pharmacy in their designated
postcodes at least once a year. Staﬀ working in shops most commonly
reported that they were visited by drug control once every 6 months,
although the range was from 3-monthly to annually. Several chains had
shops in multiple circles and therefore interacted with numerous in-
spectors. The level of control in each area appeared to diﬀer dependent
on the individuals responsible for enforcement.
Most chains and the drug control department reported that there
were no diﬀerences between the regulation of chain shops and in-
dependents. In contrast, one chain executive felt that drug controllers
came down more harshly on chains compared to independent phar-
macies in event of a violation of the rules. Chains, he described, were
treated with less leniency due to the processes and operating proce-
dures in place.
Hypothesis 2b. Self-regulation to preserve identity of brand?
A host of methods were employed by chains in order to keep con-
stant track of day-to-day operations in each store. The main strategies
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included regular shop visits from supervisors, area managers and more
senior managers. Sales reports were usually sent daily, although some
chains had information systems that enabled monitoring of real time
sales. CCTV cameras were used to monitor the behaviour of shop staﬀ
and several chains sent mystery shoppers to their stores (and their
competitors). The impression given was one of relentless monitoring.
Chains that utilised CCTV claimed to watch their staﬀ closely and staﬀ
corroborated that they were informed immediately of any sub-par
performance.
The overarching theme across all chain interviews, both with
management and shop staﬀ, was that ensuring a positive customer
experience was the highest priority. Key areas of concern included
customer service, ambience of the pharmacy, appearance of the staﬀ,
and ensuring availability of medicines. Management went to great
lengths to guarantee that in-store staﬀ were friendly and polite to their
customers. On joining a chain, staﬀ undergo training (ranging from half
a day to several weeks). The majority of this focussed on how to treat
and interact with customers. Chain executives described how in-
dependent shop owners have excellent rapport with their customers
and chains felt it was essential for their staﬀ to match this, in order to
attract and maintain customers. During shop visits, managers also
checked that the store was neat and tidy and staﬀ members were pre-
sentable.
Whilst there is irrefutable evidence that chains do self-regulate, the
aspects of practice that they strived to control were not the same as
those that concern the public health community ie sale of appropriate
medicines and advice provision. One chain CEO explained what the
training in his company involved:
“Yes, they need to dress well, they need to be able to communicate well so
then their level of English needs to be good. Their level of Hindi needs to
be good. So we employ people who can speak all the three languages
because Bangalore is like a melting point right now. So you have people
from all kinds of various cultures coming…Of course they need to follow
the SOPs again. So that stresses on how well you treat customer, how you
make the sale. How you ﬁnish the sale. So those are the things we train
them before they start.” KI#24 chain executive.
Another chain executive vented his frustration regarding the lack of
customer care he commonly observed on CCTV:
“Sometimes they will be seeing that Facebook and all, will be telling to
them don't see that, then if the customer comes, they won't stand up and
they won't greet the customers. They won't be any smile, they will be
standing like a robot and they will be doing. We will be telling you have to
do like this and all that. Because a smile is most important whenever a
customer comes.” KI#2 chain executive.
Alongside customer interaction, chains reported stock availability as
the other crucial concern. Both headquarter and in-store chain staﬀ
explained that ﬁlling all items on a customer's prescription without any
‘bounce’ products (items on a prescription that are not available) was
essential for customer satisfaction. In instances where required items
are not available, there runs a risk that the customer will go elsewhere
and not patronise the store for future transactions. Due to the large
number of brands in the Indian market and the illegal nature of brand
substitution (a diﬀerent brand with the same active ingredient cannot
be dispensed in place of the brand prescribed), this was cited as a key
challenge. Some chains report sending mystery shoppers with pre-
scriptions to monitor the ‘bounce ratio’.
We observed that employees often appeared to buy into the goals
and mission of the chain in which they worked. In interviews with in-
store employees they used a lot of the same language and talked about
the same issues as being important as the headquarter staﬀ. These
comments from a chain employee echo the concerns of the manage-
ment:
RM: Why are people coming to [pharmacy chain], in what way are you
keeping them happy?
Respondent: Availability of medicines, and we used to welcome them
with a smile, I used to check the order list of their medicines and if that
medicine is not available I used to tell them will get that evening, we used
to take their mobile numbers and call them after it. KI#16 pharmacy
aide.
There was little evidence of chains regulating the clinical aspects of
pharmacy practice in their stores-for example, the accuracy of advice
given or the appropriateness of medicines sold. A small proportion of
chains did mention that they monitored sales of POMs without a pre-
scription. One ex-staﬀ member of a leading chain explained that staﬀ
were told explicitly not to make such sales. Another working in a
smaller chain described how their head oﬃce sent mystery shoppers to
purchase POMs in order to determine whether there was illegal selling
in their pharmacies. However, only a minority of chains touched upon
this issue and it was clear that clinical governance was not an area of
interest to most chains, as shown by this conversation with one phar-
macist:
RM: Do they monitor the medicines that you are selling or the advice you
are giving?
Respondent: Medicines?
RM: In the sense, if somebody comes and says can we have something for
diarrhoea or fever - do they check what medicines you give?
Respondent: Yeah, yeah we will give common medicines for diarrhoea.
RM: But do head oﬃce check?
Respondent: No, no they won't. They don't know about this thing what
to do –only I have knowledge. They don't know about that. KI#25, chain
pharmacist.
In our SP survey, we found that the more highly restricted H1
medicines were rarely sold, by either chains or independents (R. Miller
and Goodman, 2017). We were keen to understand how pharmacy staﬀ
understood and interpreted these regulations and how drug control
authorities had achieved success in the control of these medicines. We
found that around two-thirds of both chain staﬀ and independent in-
terviewees were aware of the diﬀerence between H and H1 medicines.
Most interviewees spoke about H1 medicines with an aura of serious-
ness. They did not give a great amount of detail but there was a general
understanding that you simply did not sell these medicines. Several
informants (from both chains and independents) confused schedule H1
and X. Interviewees reported that drug control are stricter on these
restricted schedules. Regulatory authorities conﬁrmed that they were
more aggressive in the control of these schedules and that they typically
would suspend or even cancel the licence of a shop found to be selling
such medicines. Sale of H medicines, however, was only punishable by
a ﬁne or brief shop closure. One chain pharmacy had a list of these
prohibited H1 medicines on the wall for staﬀ to refer to and another
reported that there was a SOP in place for dispensing them. Asides from
these two examples we did not ﬁnd any major diﬀerences between the
attitudes of chains and independents towards the more regulated
medicine schedules.
3.3.1. Practices of bribery undermining regulatory system
Several interviewees talked about the bribing of drug controllers.
Most of these reports came from independent shop owners, who talked
candidly about this. One managing director (MD) of a chain touched
upon this but his comments related to the industry in general, rather
than any speciﬁc practices that occurred within his organisation. The
impression given by these informants was that bribery was common-
place and organised in nature. One interviewee described how all
pharmacies in his area were required to give a ﬁxed amount (4000 Rs/
$62) every 6 months and this was collected and passed onto the
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authorities by a local coordinator. In another area, ﬁxed amounts were
said to be collected monthly. Shopkeepers described how pharmacies
that ran without a pharmacist had to pay a higher rate than those where
a pharmacist was present. Interviewees explained that if bribes were
not paid then drug controllers would be sure to ﬁnd something they
could penalise for during their next inspection visit. Payment of the
bribe would ensure inspections were uneventful.
RM: How come so many medicines are sold without a prescription then?
Respondent: They get bribed. It's easy to bribe a drug controller. As long
as you pay them they will not complain.
RM: So they don't regulate POM well?
Respondent: They say they do but they don't. The entire supply chain
pays the drug controller. Retail market is unorganised but bribing is very
organised. There is a package you keep paying them and they don't come.
KI#7 chain MD
Chain staﬀ working in pharmacy branches did not talk about such
practices. However, as employees, they would not have the status to
authorise any bribes on behalf of the chain and it would likely occur at
a higher level. Even if such practices were commonplace, it is unlikely
that this information would be shared freely.
3.4. Proﬁt motive
Hypothesis 3. Low-powered incentives within hierarchical structure?
Independent pharmacy owners appeared to be more business-or-
iented than chain employees; and it was evident that their livelihood
was closely linked to sales. Whilst in theory, we expected chain staﬀ to
be less invested in sales and proﬁt, in practice they were incentivised by
numerous targets and relentless pressure from head oﬃce. Most chains
set monthly sales targets for each of their shops and some had other
speciﬁc targets. These included the sale of ‘private label’ products
(generic medicines or toiletries that are branded for that particular
chain) and number of home deliveries. Chain staﬀ reported that they
were motivated to work hard to meet these targets, because the bonuses
associated with reaching them were worthwhile and it gave them job
satisfaction. In addition, some chains oﬀered a monthly award for the
branch with the highest sales and employees were keen to win this for
‘name and fame’. Monthly sales bonuses were reported to be between
2000 ($31) and 20,000 ($311) Rs, most commonly 10,000 Rs ($156)
(divided between all store staﬀ of which there were usually 4–5). In
light of staﬀ salaries, this was relatively substantial (around 25% of
pharmacy aide and 10% of pharmacist salary) and hence motivating.
Private label incentives were particularly strong with the bigger chains
oﬀering staﬀ 10–12% of sales proﬁts. The margins on these products
were said to be 200–300%, which was very high compared with usual
margins on branded products (which are preferred by customers) of
around 15–40%.
When scrutinising the strategies of proﬁt maximisation identiﬁed
from our data, there appeared to be some diﬀerences between chain
and independent shops. Independent shop owners reported selling
POMs without a prescription because they did not want to lose business.
They admitted selling antibiotics because they had a good margin.
Finally, they stated that they gave priority to products which they had
purchased on oﬀer e.g. on a buy X strips get Y strips free basis (these
were said to commonly be antibiotics and combination cold and ﬂu
medicines). In terms of medicine sale choices amongst chain employees,
there were several reports of trying to sell private label products in the
ﬁrst instance, which is not surprising considering the strong ﬁnancial
incentives associated with these products. Only one chain staﬀ member
talked about deliberately choosing items based on their proﬁt margin.
When pushed on how they achieved their sales targets, the strategies
reported by chain staﬀ tended to be more customer orientated. For
example, if any prescription items were not in stock, they ensured those
items were ordered and delivered to the customer's home that same
day; they made lists of regular customers and called them to see if they
needed to replenish their stock; and they talked to their customers ‘like
family members’. This is not to say that independent staﬀ did not also
focus on their customers. In addition to oﬀering a friendly, timely
service, independent shops oﬀered credit to customers who could not
aﬀord medicines and cut medicine strips into smaller quantities for
poor clients. Both chain and independent pharmacy interviewees re-
ported selling medicines that they knew would ‘cure faster’- though
medicine sales based on perceived eﬃcacy is often not in line with
standard treatment guidelines.
4. Discussion
To date, research on the eﬀect of chain pharmacies in LMICs has
been limited. In addition to our SP study, two papers have investigated
the sale of over-the-counter abortifacients in Mexico, and found phar-
macy type was not a characteristic of selling such medicines (Billings
et al., 2009; Lara et al., 2011). In Thailand, a newly developed quality
indicator tool which assessed ﬁve dimensions of quality found scores in
chains to be higher than those of independents (Arkaravichien et al.,
2016). Finally, a study from India reported that compared to in-
dependent retailers, chain prices were 6% lower (p=0.02) and phar-
macopoeia compliance was 6% higher (p= 0.46) (Bennett and Yin,
2014).
While there has been a small but illuminating body of qualitative
work on the determinants of pharmaceutical use and pharmacy prac-
tices in India (Das and Das, 2006; Kamat and Nichter, 1998; Seeberg,
2012), to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to employ qualitative
methods to attempt to understand the practices of chains.
We found that most of the theoretical mechanisms that could lead to
higher quality in chains did not hold true in practice. In summary, as in
independent shops, a number of chain branches operated without a
pharmacist. Drug control authorities did not regulate chains any dif-
ferently, despite the possibilities of utilising the hierarchical structure
in place. Further, reportedly widespread bribery undermined the drug
control process. In the face of proﬁtable sales targets and constant head
oﬃce pressure to increase revenue, chain employees did not appear to
face signiﬁcantly lower-powered incentives than their independent
pharmacy counterparts. However, diﬀerences in the proﬁt maximising
strategies of chains and independents were apparent, the former being
more customer focused, and the latter more proﬁt driven-a concern
from a public health perspective because when medicine sale choices
are driven by proﬁt considerations, patient safety and clinical needs can
be compromised.
We had also anticipated that chains may self-regulate to preserve
brand identity and image. Whilst chains appeared to exert strong in-
ﬂuence over behaviour of their staﬀ, they did not attempt to control
aspects of quality relating to rational medicine use. A small subset of
chains took action towards monitoring the illegal sale of POMs without
a prescription but as one chain boss explained, ‘bringing ethical stan-
dards to corporates-that is lacking currently’. Rather, they focused on
customer service and satisfaction.
This study was conducted in a single Indian city which raises
questions over the extent to which the ﬁndings are generalisable to
other metropolises where chains are concentrated. Whilst some of the
chains studied operated only in Bengaluru, others had presence in
elsewhere in South India and even nationwide. Chain staﬀ in other
cities likely face similar incentives and monitoring procedures. The
regulatory controls governing the functioning of pharmacies are the
same throughout India, and despite likely variation in state-level im-
plementation, regulatory failure is reportedly widespread. Given these
likely similarities, the ﬁndings are likely to have relevance beyond
Bengaluru and Karnataka. Further, this work oﬀers a starting point for
further research in other LMICs where determinants of good and poor
pharmacy practice have been found to be comparable and chain growth
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is underway.
In their current state, it is unlikely that chains will provide a solu-
tion to the poor quality of care provided by pharmacies described in the
literature. However, given the tight control and inﬂuence that chains
exert over their branch staﬀ, one could argue that chains could be a
vehicle for more eﬃcient or more eﬀective quality improvement in the
future. However, it is unlikely that a change in their priorities for self-
regulation will occur without external intervention. Chains are ﬁrst and
foremost business entities; they concentrate their attentions on aspects
of quality that customers can observe (eg friendliness of staﬀ and
availability of medicines). Chains presently have no incentive to self-
regulate technical quality because, due to information asymmetries,
this is not something most customers can observe.
Pay for performance (P4P) has received much attention as an in-
novative strategy to improve quality in LMICs (Eichler, 2006). Whilst
there are no existing examples of using ﬁnancial incentives to improve
rational medicine use, a number of high-income countries have in-
itiated schemes that pay pharmacies to deliver patient-centred services
(Mossialos et al., 2013). Perhaps the most obvious response would be to
focus eﬀorts on strengthening the regulatory environment. While the
pharmacy market has evolved, it is striking that the regulatory response
has lagged behind and no modiﬁcations have been introduced in the
light of new organisational arrangements, such as chains. For example,
within the structure of chains, we noted that senior management teams
lacked a trained pharmacist to take responsibility for patient safety and
hold branch staﬀ to account for their clinical actions. This is not cur-
rently a legal requirement, but arguably should be (as in some other
countries). In some countries, regulation of medical practitioners is
delegated to professional organisations. We found that the interviewees
did not appear to have a strong professional identity and others have
noted that professional standards are lacking in pharmacy services in
India (Adepu and Nagavi, 2009). There is arguably scope for profes-
sional pharmacy bodies to take a more active role in improving phar-
macy practice. For example, they could advance continuing profes-
sional development activities and issue guidelines for practice.
Encouraging peer review and fostering an ethos of professionalism
amongst staﬀ within chains may go some way to improving the current
situation. Additionally, given that chains already organise training for
their staﬀ, they may also be well placed to deliver clinically-based
training interventions more eﬃciently.
Others have reﬂected on the disconnect between regulatory strate-
gies and the realities of health markets in India and LMICs more gen-
erally (Bloom et al., 2008, 2014; Ensor and Weinzierl, 2007; Peters and
Muraleedharan, 2008; Sheikh et al., 2013). In their study of the ar-
chitecture of health regulation in two Indian states, Sheikh et al. (2013)
highlighted widespread gaps in both policy design and implementation
with this mixed (public and private) health system. They found that
implementation shortcomings were underpinned by inadequacy of
human and ﬁnancial resources; ambivalence of regulatory staﬀ re-
garding the roles of their agencies; and inﬁltration and dominance of
private sector interests within regulatory institutions leading to con-
cerns of regulatory capture.
Currently, enforcement is typiﬁed by ‘command and control’ me-
chanisms of universal inspection and sanction but these methods appear
to be ill-suited given limited resources, overwhelming numbers of
providers, and rent-seeking oﬃcials. It may be possible to streamline
external regulation through utilising the hierarchical management
structure of chains. Any such developments should take into account
the latest thinking in regulatory design, which includes alternatives to
administrative and bureaucratic approaches such as responsive and
risk-based regulation (Black, 2005; Braithwaite, 2006). In addition to
‘market supply-oriented’ approaches, such as incentive schemes, Bloom
and colleagues (Bloom et al., 2014) identify ‘consumer or citizen-or-
iented’ strategies such as consumer education and empowerment; and
‘collaboration-oriented’ eﬀorts, for example partnerships between
government, civil society actors, providers and technical experts to
agree and set locally measurable and enforceable standards for per-
formance.
Whilst improved regulatory strategies have the potential to trans-
form pharmacy markets, it is necessary to acknowledge the high level of
corruption that is treated as normal in Karnataka. A Task Force on
Health and Family Welfare of the State (Karnataka) Government re-
ported that corruption topped a list of 12 key issues of concern for the
State's health system (Sudarshan and Prashanth, 2011). Corruption in
the health sector is increasingly being linked with poor outcomes in
LMICs (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008).
Anti-corruption advocates call for good governance, transparency,
and zero tolerance as the basis of strategies to address the problem (Jain
et al., 2014). In Karnataka, a number of initiatives have been instigated
which aim to increase people's participation in the planning, im-
plementation and monitoring of health services (Sudarshan and
Prashanth, 2011). Jain describes the payment of bribes and use of
connections to get ‘a little ahead, a little extra, a little quicker’ as in-
grained in people's attitudes (Jain et al., 2014). Empowerment of citi-
zens has been proposed as an important step to bring about changing
cultural attitudes that have long been accepting of corruption, ulti-
mately leading to a law-based society (Johnston, 1998). However, there
is obviously no overnight solution and social change is likely be in-
cremental and slow.
5. Conclusion
Chains are expanding rapidly in India and elsewhere in Asia, South
America and Africa. Going forward, there is interest in the potential of
pharmacy chains in LMICs as a solution to the substandard practices
that typify retail pharmacy in these settings. Up until now, there has
been no empirical evidence of whether and how these chains do enable
quality improvements. We have found that, in their current state, ex-
pectations for quality improvement were not in evidence. However, the
existing architecture and the inﬂuence they exert over their staﬀ oﬀers
opportunity for intervention and a potential focus for regulatory bodies,
meaning that chains could prove to be a vehicle through which to aﬀect
change in the sector in future. However, a shift in focus from customer
satisfaction to outcomes of public health concern is unlikely without
either ﬁnancial incentives or strengthened external regulation.
Moreover, without good governance initiatives that aim to reduce
corruption in the sector, it is likely that quality issues will persist.
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